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Open vs. sealed-bid auctions:
testing for revenue equivalence
under Singapore’s vehicle
quota system
Winston T. H. Koh*, Roberto S. Mariano and Yiu Kuen Tse
School of Economics and Social Sciences, Singapore Management
University, 90 Stamford Road, 178903 Singapore
Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we
study if revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched
from a sealed-bid format (May 1990 to June 2001) to an open bidding
format since July 2001. Our econometric analysis indicates the change in
auction format led to a change in bidding behavior. On average, the quota
license premium under the open bidding format is about US$1000 (about
7.5% of the Category E license price in June 2001) lower, compared to the
forecast level that would have prevailed if there had been no change in the
auction format.
I. Introduction
This article studies the bidding behaviour in a multi-
object uniform price auction, under both the sealed-
bid and open formats. The context of our study is the
vehicle quota system (VQS) in Singapore, which
was implemented in May 1990. Under the VQS,
a prospective car buyer must first obtain a vehicle
quota license, referred to as a Certificate of
Entitlement (or more commonly, COE). Each quota
license allows a vehicle to be on the roads for
10 years. Until June 2001, the vehicle licenses were
allocated through a sealed-bid uniform price auction
that was held monthly.1 Following a government
review of the VQS, an open online bidding format
was implemented in phases from July 2001 onwards.
From July 2001 to March 2002, two auctions were
conducted each month, one using the sealed-bid
format and the other using the open-bid format.
This ‘overlapping’ phase is essentially a learning
phase for bidders to get acquainted with the online
system, and to fine-tune the bidding system. From
April 2002, the fortnightly vehicle licenses auctions
were conducted using the open bidding format
(during the first and third weeks of each month).
The switch from a sealed-bid format to an open-
bidding format for the quota license auctions offers
us a unique opportunity to study the issue of the
choice of auction format and its implications on the
auction revenue generated.
An important result in auction theory is the
revenue equivalence theorem, which states that if
identical objects are auctioned in a simultaneous
auction where the set of winners are those who
submit the highest bids, and where valuations are
independent and participants are risk-neutral, then
it does not matter whether the auction is conducted
in a sealed-bid format or as in an open format.
*Corresponding author. E-mail: winstonkoh@smu.edu.sg
1 The first auction was held in May 1990, which covered the period May to July 1990. From August 1990 to June 2001,
the auction was conducted monthly, and from July 2001 onwards, twice a month.
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The revenue equivalence theorem, as first proven in
Vickrey (1961), and subsequently generalized in
Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981),
implies that all standard auctions, such as the first-
price sealed-bid auction (where each winner pays his
own bid), the second price sealed-bid auction (where
the winners pay the highest rejected bid), the open
outcry ascending (English) auction, or the open
outcry descending (Dutch) auction are equivalent in
terms of the expected revenue generated for each
object auctioned.
However, if the assumptions of independent
valuations or risk neutrality do not hold, then the
different auctions rank differently in terms of their
expected revenue generated per object put up for
auction. Specifically, when the participants in an
auction are risk-averse but valuations are indepen-
dent, a first-price sealed-bid auction will generate
higher revenue than an open uniform-price auction
(as shown in Maskin and Riley, 1984). The intuition
behind this result is that if individuals are risk-averse,
they would bid more aggressively in a sealed-bid
auction to increase the probability of winning, by
giving up some of the net payoff conditional on
winning an allocation.2
On the other hand, if bidders are risk-neutral and
valuations are not independent, but affiliated3 so that
there is a common-value element in the bidders’
valuations, the second-price open (i.e. ascending
English outcry) auctions will generate higher expected
revenue than the second-price sealed-bid auction,
which in turn, dominates the first-price sealed-bid
auction. The underlying principle at work here is the
greater informational linkage among bidders in the
open auction format that allows bidders to revise
their valuations as the auction takes place (Milgrom
and Weber, 1982). A recent paper that examines the
revenue equivalence hypothesis in an experimental
context is Chew and Nishimura (2003).
In the context of the quota license auctions in
Singapore, the valuation of a vehicle license is not
strictly private value, since the bids that car buyers
are willing to submit, through the car dealers, are
dependent on the expected vehicle demand in each
auction, the available quota in future auctions, as
well as the outlook on the economy, etc. Hence, if car
buyers are risk averse and the valuations that they
place on vehicle licenses are affiliated, the switch of
the quota license auction from a sealed-bid format to
an open online format should produce an empirical
difference in the bidding behaviour and the revenue
generated per quota license. This provides the
motivation for our study in this article.
To study if revenue equivalence holds, we con-
structed an econometric model for the quota license
auction under the sealed-bid format (for the period
January 1996 to June 2001), and then used the
estimated model to forecast the quota license
premium under the open online auction format.
The hypothesis we are testing is that if revenue
equivalence holds, the estimated regression model
should produce close estimates for the quota license
premiums under the open online format (specifically,
for the period of our study from May 2002 to
March 2003). Based on our analysis, we found
evidence to support the view that the revenue
equivalence does not hold following the switch in
the auction format of the VQS. Our analysis shows
that the auction revenue generated under the open
online auction format are lower than would have
been the case if the sealed-bid format had continued
to be in place.
Although a number of studies have been conducted
to assess the equity and efficiency of the VQS –
among them, Phang (1993), Koh and Lee (1994),
Phang et al. (1996), Chin and Smith (1997),
Tan (2001), Koh (2003) and most recently, Hon and
Yong (2004) – the present study is the first to test if
revenue equivalence holds for Singapore’s vehicle
quota auction.4
The rest of the article is structured as follows.
Section II provides a brief review of the VQS in
Singapore. Section III discusses the issues involved
in modelling the vehicle quota license auctions.
Section IV presents the econometric model and
discusses the results from the forecasting exercise
and its implications for testing if revenue equivalence
holds. Section V concludes the article.
2 Since the second-price sealed-bid auction is strategically equivalent to the uniform-price open auction, bidding one’s
valuation is the dominant strategy in both cases. Hence, even if participants are risk averse, the revenue-equivalence principle
continues to hold for the second-price auctions when bidders’ valuations are private values.
3Roughly speaking, if one bidder observes a favourable signal regarding some relevant aspect of the bidding environment,
it makes the conditional probability of favourable values for the other relevant aspects more likely. The practical implication
for bidding behaviour under the VQS is that if a participant in the quota license auction is willing to submit a higher bid
because he observes a signal that demand for cars is likely to be higher (due to, say, seasonal demand), then he should think
that other bidders are also prepared to do so. In other words, if one bidder forecasts a higher price, then he should expect that
other bidders should also forecast higher prices.
4 Articles that study the impact of quotas and quantity controls in markets include Oczkowski (1991) and Gaasland and
Vardal (1998). Other econometric studies on the transport sector include Romilly et al. (2001) and Johansson-Stenman (2002).
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II. The Vehicle Quota System in Singapore
The VQS was introduced in May 1990 to control the
growth of the motor vehicle population. A vehicle
registered with a quota license has an initial lifespan
of 10 years. At the end of this period, the owner may
either de-register the vehicle or renew the vehicle
license for a further 5-year or 10-year period,
by paying a ‘prevailing quota license premium’,
calculated as the 3-month moving average of the
quota license premium. Under the VQS, motor
vehicles are classified into several categories, with a
separate license quota for each category. When first
introduced in 1990, there were seven quota license
categories, namely: Category 1 for cars of 1000 cc and
below; Category 2 for cars of 1001–1600 cc and below
and taxis; Category 3 for cars of 1601–2000 cc and
below; Category 4 for cars of above 2000 cc; Category
5 for goods vehicles and buses; Category 6 for
motorcycles; Category 7, an ‘Open’ category for
registration of all types of vehicles.
For every quota year beginning in May, the quota
for new vehicles is determined based on the target
growth rate in the car population and the forecast
number of de-registrations. The Land Transport
Authority of Singapore (LTA) releases on its website
(http://www.lta.gov.sg) the exact calculations for the
target vehicle population and the number of licenses
available for auction each month.5 The projected
quota for each category is allocated equally over
12 months. To allow flexibility in the composition of
the vehicle population, 25% of the de-registered
vehicles in each category are allotted to the ‘Open’
category, where the licenses can be used to register
vehicles belonging to any category.
Since 1990, the VQS has undergone a number of
modifications. Some of the major changes include:
(i) the quota licenses were initially transferable but
made non-transferable following public anger over
speculative activities; (ii) a ‘weekend’ car quota
license category was also introduced in May 1991,
but discontinued in 1994 due to lack of popularity;
(iii) the number of quota categories was reduced
to five in 1999 with the merger of Categories 1 and 2
to form category A, and the merger of Categories
3 and 4 to form Category B. The other categories
were renamed accordingly; (iv) the introduction of an
open bidding format for quota licenses, in phases
from July 2001 onwards. Figure 1 below shows the
movements in the quota license premiums from May
1990 to June 2003.
Following a government review in 1999, the format
of the license auction was changed to an open format.
The switch was carried in several phases, beginning in
July 2001 for the Open category license. The open
auction is conducted online in real time, at the
website of the LTA. Each online auction takes place
over 3 days, at the beginning and middle of the
month. Bidders can see the market-clearing bids in
real time, and use the information to update their
valuations, decide to enter or drop out of the auction,
or revise their bids on-line.
The market-clearing bid is the lowest successful
bid. As there are many participants in the license
auctions, the distribution of bids is approximately
continuous; hence, the lowest successful bid is
generally be close to the highest rejected bid, so that
the license auction is a second-price auction.
Although a license auction may be oversubscribed,
not all the quota licenses may be allocated. This is
because there is no tie breaking procedure for
identical bids at the market-clearing level. These
bids are treated as unsuccessful bids, and the next
highest bid sets the license premium. The unallocated
licenses are carried over to the next auction.
As of June 2003, a total of 905 281 licenses were
auctioned in 156 auctions. In total, these auctions
generated revenue totaling S$20.22 billion (US$11.55
billion) for the Singapore government (source: LTA).
Each auction yielded an average revenue of S$129.05
million (US$74.06 million), and each quota license
issued since May 1990 had cost an average of
S$22 334 (US$12 762). Tables 1 and 2 show the
average quota license premiums and its volatility,
respectively. The calculations were based on an
exchange rate of US$1 to S$1.75.
III. Modelling the Quota License Auction
We briefly discuss the main considerations in model-
ling the quota license auctions. First, we note that
the VQS is an example of an affiliated values repeated
multiple-object auction. In other words, the valua-
tions of bidders and the sealed bids that they submit
have a common-value element. The participants in
these auctions form expectations about the intensity
of demand in each auction, based on their assessment
of the economic environment and the anticipated
vehicle demand in the current and future auctions.
Bidders’ beliefs and expectations, as well as their
5 Since the change in the total vehicle population is given by the number of new registrations less the number of de-
registrations, the total number of quota licenses available for auction each year is equal to the sum of the target vehicle
population, the projected number of de-registrations and unallocated quota carried forward from the previous year.
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Fig. 1. Quota license premiums from May 1990 to June 2003 (Singapore dollars)
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decision to participate in a particular auction, may be
based on both private information and public
information (such as the outlook on economic
growth and interest rates, changes in government
policies and modifications to VQS, etc.).
Additionally, announcements of changes in future
license quotas will lead to revisions in the expecta-
tions of future quota premiums, and this will affect
bidders’ decision to participate in a particular auction
– either postponing participation or bringing forward
the participation. Auction participants may also
study the bid distributions of previous auctions
(available from September 1994 to June 2001 for
the sealed-bid format). Conditional on the public
information and their private information, each car
buyer computes his valuations for the quota licenses
Table 1. Annual average quota license premiums (Singapore dollars)
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5 Cat 6 Cat 7 Cat 8
1990 2686 4694 6195 2007 708 205 5545
1991 5207 6734 8047 8049 2095 244 8644 4640
1992 14 864 18 717 20 457 20 138 6536 1 23 413 13 355
1993 21 142 25 802 26 742 24 681 18 365 1 26 880 15 340
1994 26 945 42 622 68 757 74 749 28 289 291 72 606 28 383
1995 21 057 39 830 55 338 60 966 26 092 2677 57 888
1996 19 191 43 447 45 525 47 683 26 415 2585 48 361
1997 33 075 54 128 66 949 66 925 33 658 2977 67 425
1998 28 668 34 504 28 803 34 303 16 891 731 32 751
Max 41 008 62 208 95 100 100 500 39 000 4202 105 000 45 300
Date Jun 97 Jun 97 Nov 94 Dec 94 Dec 94 Nov 95 Nov 94 Sep 94
Cat A Cat B Cat C Cat D Cat E
1999 40 242 43 068 24 645 770 42 683
2000 37 845 36 189 19 936 1332 36 961
2001 26 987 28 379 16 878 814 27 891
2002 30 896 31 982 19 317 225 23 395
2003 29 236 29 142 11 354 263 29 093
Source: Land Transport Authority of Singapore (http://www.lta.gov.sg).
Notes: aThe figures reported here are for each calendar year. The figures for 2003 are up to end-June.
bThe annual average quota license premiums are calculated as weighted averages of the monthly quota license premiums.
The weights are the number of quota licenses available for tender each month. In some cases, the weighted average quota
license premiums differ substantially from simple monthly average quota license premiums.
cThe volatility of quota license premiums is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly quota license premiums.
Table 2. Volatility of quota license premiums (Singapore dollars)
Cat 1 Cat 2 Cat 3 Cat 4 Cat 5 Cat 6 Cat 7 Cat 8
1990 1754 3022 3857 2216 759 117 3046
1991 3600 3767 5022 6005 2643 235 5436 2791
1992 3470 4639 5410 7542 1924 0 4124 2460
1993 6635 7081 9005 9487 7987 0 8946 2951
1994 4977 7062 14 165 19 442 5978 694 17 760 8507
1995 4680 4878 9246 7244 4227 778 11 489
1996 3643 2800 6166 2444 3266 535 3707
1997 5349 6587 6543 6740 1796 438 6347
1998 4069 5996 12 711 9006 5594 341 6332
Cat A Cat B Cat C Cat D Cat E
1999 10 962 12 193 6750 276 6662
2000 4815 11 257 6880 247 8639
2001 8912 4933 6990 239 3616
2002 2475 4202 4557 268 6260
2003 1786 2440 676 320 2472
Notes: See Table 1 footnote.
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in each auction. As shown in Milgrom and Weber
(1982) and Klemperer (1999), for second-price
auctions with affiliated valuations, each player’s
optimal strategy is to bid as if as he is the marginal
successful bidder.
The difference between the sealed-bid and open
auction format is the stronger informational linkage
under the open auction. Under the sealed-bid format,
bidders submitted their bids independently and did
not have the opportunity to observe other bids and
revise their valuations. In contrast, under the open
auction, car buyers can monitor the market clearing
price in real time, and then decide if they should
participate in the auction, revise their bids or drop
out of the auction (e.g. by not raising their bids above
the prevailing market-clearing bids). The greater
transparency of the open auction provides stronger
informational linkage.
Therefore, if risk aversion among car buyers is
small, an application of the results of Milgrom
and Weber (1982) should lead us to expect that the
switch to the open online auction format for the
vehicle license auction (which is akin to an English
outcry second-price auction) will produce a higher
expected revenue per license compared with the
sealed-bid second-price quota license auction.
However, if risk aversion among car buyers is
significant, this will produce a countervailing effect
as the switch to an open-online auction, by producing
greater transparency will lead to less aggressive
bidding.6
IV. Econometric Analysis
Our study focuses on the period from January 1996 to
June 2001 (66 monthly auctions) for the sealed-bid
format, and the period April 2002 to March 2003
(24 fortnightly auctions) for the open online format.
Although data from 1990 to 1995 on the sealed-bid
auctions were available, we exclude them from
our study in order to minimize the impact of
structural changes in the economy on the econometric
analysis. The data on the license auctions are
obtained from LTA’s website, while the macro-
economic data were obtained from the website of
the Monetary Authority of Singapore (http://
www.mas.gov.sg) and the Department of Statistics,
Ministry of Trade and Industry, Singapore (http://
www.singstat.gov.sg).
Under the open online auction, bidders whose
valuations are lower than the market clearing bids
will not enter the auction. Thus, the realized bid
distributions under open auction format are necessa-
rily truncated distributions, since the data from
participants who had chosen not to enter the auction
are not captured. It is therefore not appropriate to
use the bid distributions of the open auction to
compute a measure of the demand comparable to the
bid-quota ratio under the sealed-bid format. We have
elected to construct an econometric model of the
demand for quota licenses based macro-economic
factors.
The forecasting model is constructed as follows.
The demand for vehicle licenses is a function of car
demand, which is in turn influenced by the macro-
economic environment. The appropriate macro-
economic indicators to use are Singapore’s industrial
production and non-oil exports; these are reported on
a monthly basis and impact the economic outlook,
consumer confidence and purchasing behaviour.
Other variables used to construct the econometric
model are the interest rate differentials of the
3-month commercial bank paper and the 5-year
Singapore government bond, against the 3-month
Singapore Treasury bill rates. The use of bond-bill
spread and paper-bill spread as a predictor of
economic activity has been documented by Stock
and Watson (1989), Bernanke (1990), Friedman and
Kuttner (1992), Harvey (1991, 1997) and Tse (1998).
We consider the first-order differences in the monthly
license premiums as function of the interest rate
differentials and the first-order differences in the
non-oil exports and the industrial production indices.
Our objective is to examine if the revenue
equivalence result holds for the vehicle quota license
auctions under the sealed-bid and the open online
formats. Using the estimated econometric model for
the sealed-bid auction, for the period of January 1996
to June 2001, we apply the model to forecast the
quota license premiums in the open auction from
April 2002 to March 2003.7
We shall use the following notation in the
forecasting model. Let Pt denote the quota license
premium (i.e. the market clearing winning bid); NOEt
denotes the level of non-oil exports; IPt denotes the
index of industrial production; PBSt denotes the
interest rate differential of 3-month commercial bank
paper over the 3-month Treasury bill; TSt denotes the
interest rate differential of the 5-year government
bond over the 3-month Treasury bill. We shall
consider the following first-order differences in the
6 These issues are discussed in more details in Koh and Lee (1994) and Koh (2003).
7 In June 2003, the data for industrial production and non-oil export were available up to March 2003.
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regression equation. Let PtPtPt1 denote
the monthly variation in quota license premiums.
We similarly define NOEt and IPt to be the
monthly change in the non-oil exports and industrial
production, respectively. We estimate the following
econometric model:8
Pt ¼ 0 þ 1NOEt þ 2IPt þ 3PBSt þ 4TSt
ð1Þ
For the estimation of the above econometric
model, we consider the quota license auctions in
Categories 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 from January 1996 to
June 2001. We focus on the household demand for
passenger cars, and exclude Categories 5 (goods
vehicles and buses) and 6 (motorcycles) from our
study, as these categories are largely for commercial
purposes.
As we noted earlier, in May 1999, Categories 1 and
2 were merged to form Category A, while Categories
3 and 4 were merged to form Category B. Category 7
was renamed as Category E. For the purpose of data
continuity, we have decided to calculate, for the
period of January 1996 to April 1999, an index of the
quota license premiums for Categories 1 and 2,
weighted by the number of quota licenses in each
category, to proxy for a ‘Category A’ quota license
premium. A similar index is constructed for
Categories 3 and 4 over the same period.
We also noted earlier that between July 2001 and
March 2002, the open online format was gradually
introduced, beginning with the ‘Open’ category,
and was conducted alternately with the sealed-bid
format. Specifically, the sealed-bid format was
conducted at the beginning of each month, while
the open online format was conducted in the middle
of the month. During this period, adjustments were
made to various aspects of the online open-auction
format, as bidders learnt to use the system. In light of
the fine-tuning that took place during the initial
months of the open-auction format, we have decided
to exclude this ‘overlapping’ phase of 9 months for
the purpose of testing if the revenue equivalence
proposition holds after the change in the bidding
format for the license auctions.
Finally, we wish to point out that the Singapore
economy was largely stable over 2001–2002.
Therefore, although there was a 9-month gap
between the cessation of the fully sealed-bid
auction format in June 2001 and the start of the
fully online open-auction format in April 2002,
the macro-economic environment in Singapore was
largely unchanged, so that the econometric fore-
casting model remains valid for the purpose of our
study.
Results
The results of the regression analysis are presented
in Table 3. Using the estimated regression equations,
we forecast the quota license premiums for the
period April 2002 to March 2003 under the open
Table 3. Estimation of the econometric model for January 1996 to June 2001
Quota license category
Category A Category B Category E
0 324.977 (0.188) 1204.863 (0.418) 2111.729 (1.290)
1 0.327 (0.269) 2.310 (1.140) 0.181 (0.157)
2 8.517 (0.110) 115.436 (0.896) 1.467 (0.020)
3 907.9141 (0.680) 5182.020 (2.326) 3324.959 (2.628)
4 215.088 (0.243) 1123.713 (0.762) 100.768 (0.120)
R-squared 0.010 0.107 0.109
Durbin–Watson 1.104 2.63 1.342
No. of observations 64 64 64
Notes: 1. The figures in parentheses are the t-statistics.
2. As Categories 1 and 2 were merged to form Category A in April 1999, an index of the quota license
premiums for Categories 1 and 2, weighted by the number of quota licenses in each category, is constructed
to proxy for a ‘Category A’ license premium over the period January 1996 to April 1999. A similar index is
constructed for Categories 3 and 4 over the same period for a ‘Category B’ license premium.
8Clearly, we can fine-tune the methodology used to construct the econometric model. For instance, we could include other
economic variables, such as inflation rates and stock market indices that may have an impact on the bidding behaviour of car
buyers. Furthermore, we could introduce appropriate lags in the regression estimation. However, the qualitative aspects of
our results are likely to remain the same.
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online format. We then compare the forecast quota
license premiums with the actual quota license
premiums to compute the forecast errors, which are
presented in Table 4.
We checked the robustness of the econometric
model under the sealed-bid system as follows. We
estimated the model for 58 observations, from
September 1994 to November 2000, and used it to
predict the quota license premiums for the sealed-bid
auctions from December 2000 to May 2001
(6 months). The forecast errors of the license
premiums in these auctions were statistically not
significant. Varying the estimation sample up to 60
observations with the corresponding forecast
observations down to four data points produced
similar results. Thus, we conclude that there was no
structural break in the model under the sealed-bid
auction format, as indicated by its success in
providing unbiased post-sample forecasts. Failure of
the model in providing unbiased forecasts under the
open-auction format is therefore attributed to the
structural break in bidding behaviour, caused by the
switch to a different auction format.
As is evident from Table 4, the forecast errors
are negative for all three quota categories, and
are statistically significant at the 5% level for
Categories B and E. The results suggest that revenue
equivalence does not hold following the switch from
the sealed-bid format to the open online format.
The switch in the auction format appeared to have
produced a dampening impact on the auction revenue
per license.
The results suggest that by providing greater
transparency, the open online format also led to less
aggressive bidding in the license auctions. A plausible
explanation that is consistent with this result is
that risk aversion among bidders is significant,
so that bidding behaviour had been particularly
aggressive under the sealed-bid format of the license
auctions.
Table 5 below presents the estimated net impact on
auction revenue in each quota license auction,
Table 4. Forecast errors in quota license premiums: May
2002 to March 2003
Forecast errors of quota license
premiums (in Singapore dollars)
Category A Category B Category E
May 2002 1913 5200 2605
2311 9792 5249
June 2002 1814 10 419 6894
2943 8921 7178
July 2002 1915 1509 3389
203 2582 3358
August 2002 1064 1945 2040
546 258 83
September 2002 464 2554 2011
2628 6274 4107
October 2002 877 162 1874
2393 2786 68
November 2003 2309 4005 4454
1838 2687 4260
December 2003 230 7804 1448
1 173 11 537 2822
January 2003 309 3989 903
791 3317 1120
February 2003 3022 2442 2840
4008 3555 624
March 2003 2744 7494 8355
3049 6534 6053
Mean 685 3330 2946
Standard
deviation
1979.525 4856.062 2750.370
t-Statistics 1.62308 3.21641 5.02404
Note: The forecast error in quota license premium is
calculated by comparing the predicted quota license
premiums and the actual license premiums. If revenue
equivalence holds, the forecast errors should be statistically
insignificant.
Table 5. Estimated impact on auction revenue following the
switch to an open auction format: May 2002 to March 2003
Forecast errors of quota license premiums
(in Singapore dollars)
Category A Category B Category E
May 2002 2 155 625 2 693 379 2 422 322
2 495 568 5 297 241 4 603 063
June 2002 2 004 973 5 928 495 6 466 709
3 334 935 4 942 316 6 747 457
July 2002 2 122 155 840 424 3 060 244
226 616 1 427 757 3 035 609
August 2002 1 186 609 1 079 361 1 834 167
600 355 139 983 73 742
September 2002 514 137 1 412 482 1 846 140
2 938 079 3 570 030 3 835 981
October 2002 965 600 89 685 1 707 646
2 656 254 1 535 184 61 969
November 2003 3 108 196 2 655 529 4 823 565
2 441 142 1 604 332 4 660 322
December 2003 304 294 4 830 966 1 594 777
1 568 064 8 399 277 3 053 923
January 2003 412 621 2 820 195 988 167
1 048 181 2 192 511 1 231 166
February 2003 4 046 460 1 602 221 3 095 622
5 350 682 2 343 016 676 438
March 2003 5 461 108 4 968 576 8 614 457
2 155 625 2 693 379 2 422 322
Cumulative
impact
21 476 615 43 389 148 63 457 345
Note: The estimated revenue impact is calculated by taking
the forecast error and multiplying it by the number of
vehicle licenses allocated each month.
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following the switch in the auction format.
The cumulative impact from May 2002 to March
2003 is an estimated decrease of S$128 323 108
(or US$73 327 490) in auction revenue. This translates
into average difference of S$2040 (or US$1166) for
the 62 900 quota licenses auctioned in the three
categories during this period. The price of a Category
E license in June 2001 is S$27 048; thus, the average
difference of S$2040 represents an estimated 7.5%
drop in license price over the period May 2002 to
March 2003.
The estimated reduction in auction revenue does
not affect in any significant manner the government’s
fiscal position. Since the reduction in uncertainty over
cost of car ownership is an important issue for
car buyers, it is likely that net social welfare has
improved as a result of the switch to the open online
auction format.
V. Concluding Comments
Since the VQS was introduced in 1990, it has been
suggested many times by the Singaporean public for a
change in the format of the quota license auction
from a sealed-bid format to an open format. The
basic argument put forward was that the sealed-bid
format puts car buyers at a disadvantage as they were
not able to learn about the market conditions and bid
appropriately. As a result, car buyers typically
delegated the bidding decision to the car distributors,
who determined the bids to submit, on behalf of
the car buyers. In fact, the common practice is for
car dealers to offer a bundled package, with a
‘subsidy’ for a quota license if the car buyer lets the
dealer bid on his behalf.
The results in this article indicate that revenue
equivalence does not hold in the case of the quota
license auction in Singapore. Furthermore, it also
provides support for the view that an open auction is
beneficial for car buyers, as each car buyer stands to
save an average of about S$2000 (or about US$1100)
– roughly 7.5% of the price of a Category E quota
license in June 2001 – for a vehicle license that they
must obtain. With greater transparency and less
uncertainty, buyers are better off under the open
auction system.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Editors of the journal for
their helpful comments and suggestions. Research
support from Singapore Management University is
gratefully acknowledged. James Chow and Riki
Hidajat provided excellent research assistance.
References
Bernanke, B. S. (1990) On the predictive power of interest
rates and interest rate spreads, New England Economic
Review, No. 112, 4th Quarter, 71–85.
Chew, S.-H. and Nishimura, N. (2003) Revenue
non-equivalence between the English and the
second-price auctions: experimental evidence,
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51,
443–58.
Chin, A. and Smith, P. (1997) Automobile ownership and
government policy: the economics of Singapore’s
vehicle quota scheme, Transportation Research, 31A,
129–40.
Friedman, B. M. and Kuttner, K. N. (1992) Money,
income, prices and interest rates, American Economic
Review, 82, 472–92.
Gaasland, I. and Erling, V. (1998) Tariff or quota
protection – a case study of the Norwegian apple
market, Applied Economics, 30, 951–7.
Harvey, C. R. (1991) The term structure and
the world economic growth, Journal of Fixed Income,
1, 4–17.
Harvey, C. R. (1997) The relation between the term
structure of interest rates and Canadian
economic growth, Canadian Journal of Economics,
30, 169–93.
Hon, M. T. and Yong, S.-K. (2004) The price of owning a
car: an analysis of auction quota premium in
Singapore, Applied Economics, 36, 739–51.
Johansson-Stenman, O. (2002) Estimating individual
driving distance by car and public transport use in
Sweden, Applied Economics, 34, 959–67.
Klemperer, P. (1999) Auction theory: a guide to the
literature, Journal of Economic Surveys, 13, 227–86.
Koh, W. T. H. (2003) Control of vehicle ownership
and market competition: theory and Singapore’s
experience with the vehicle quota system,
Transportation Research, 37A, 749–70.
Koh, W. T. H. and Lee, D. K. C. (1994) The vehicle quota
system in Singapore: an assessment, Transportation
Research, 28A, 39–47.
Maskin, E. and Riley, J. (1984) Optimal auctions with risk
averse buyers, Econometrica, 52, 1473–518.
Milgrom, P. and Weber, R. J. (1982) A theory of
auctions and competitive bidding, Econometrica, 50,
1089–122.
Myerson, R. B. (1981) Optimal auction design,
Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, 588–73.
Oczkowski, E. (1991) The econometrics of markets
with quantity controls, Applied Economics, 23,
497–504.
Phang, S.-Y. (1993) Singapore’s motor vehicle policy:
review of recent changes and a suggested alternative,
Transportation Research, 27A, 320–36.
Phang, S.-Y., Wong, W.-K and Chia, N. C. (1996)
Singapore’s experience with car quotas: issues and
policy processes, Transport Policy, 3, 145–53.
Singapore’s vehicle quota system and open vs. sealed-bid auctions 133
Romilly, P., Song, H. and Liu, X. (2001) Car ownership
and use in Britain: a comparison of the empirical
results of alternative cointegration estimation
methods and forecasts, Applied Economics, 33,
1803–18.
Riley, J. and Samuelson, W. F. (1981) Optimal auctions,
American Economic Review, 71, 381–92.
Stock, J. H. and Watson, M. W. (1989) NBER
Macroeconomics Annual (Eds) O. J. Blanchard and
S. Fischer, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Tan, L.-H. (2001) Rationing rules and outcomes: the
experience of Singapore’s vehicle quota system, IMF
Working Paper No. 01–136, International Monetary
Fund.
Tse, Y. K. (1998) Interest rate spreads and the prediction
of real economic activity: the case of Singapore,
The Developing Economies, 36, 289–304.
Vickrey, W. (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions,
and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance,
16, 8–37.
134 W. T. H. Koh et al.
